Sættes de aktivistiske investorer under coronakrisen skakmat?

    Sættes de aktivistiske storinvestorer under aktienedturen og coronakrisen skakmat, så de ikke kan gennemføre planlagte raids mod ledelser på de kommende generalforsamlinger? I en analyse af situationen hos de aktivistiske investorer hedder det:

    “It is important to understand that if an activist launches a proxy contest to replace directors, an activist must be prepared to remain in the stock for the foreseeable future—at least until the annual shareholder meeting and, if successful in obtaining board seats, at least 6-12 months beyond that.

    While there are no legal restrictions to the contrary, as a practical matter, an activist cannot initiate a proxy contest and sell or reduce its position shortly afterward. An activist who does this stands to lose credibility with long-term institutional investors and becomes more susceptible to being portrayed as a “short term” investor in future activism campaigns.

    It is even more difficult for an activist to exit a stock if an employee of the activist fund, rather than candidates that are at least nominally independent, takes a board seat. Material nonpublic information received by the activist employee in the board room is imputed to the activist fund, thereby restricting the fund’s ability to trade in the stock.”